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Testing	the	Chapeau-Tests	on	Special	and	
Differential	Treatment	
How	WTO	Case-Law	Could	Inform	Flexibilities	in	General	WTO	Law	
Charlotte	Sieber-Gasser*		
DRAFT	Discussion	Paper	for	the	5th	PEPA	SIEL	Conference,	Luxembourg,	14-15	April	2016	
comments	welcome,	not	for	citation			 ABSTRACT	Most	 recent	 case-law	 and	 scholarly	 work	 suggests	 that	 the	 exception	clauses	in	GATT	Art.	XX	and	GATS	Art.	XIV	provide	a	meaningful	regula-tory	 instrument	 in	balancing	domestic	 trade	policies.	Arguably,	 results	from	the	two-tier	analysis	could	serve	as	a	basis	 for	a	 legal	benchmark	for	 the	 scope	 of	 Special	 and	 Differential	 Treatment	 (SDT)	 flexibilities.	SDT	could	 theoretically	altogether	be	 replaced	with	 the	general	excep-tions	if	they	were	to	provide	sufficient	and	meaningful	flexibility	for	de-veloping	 countries	 and	 Least-Developed	 Countries	 (LDCs).	 This	 paper	assesses	the	suitability	of	the	two-tier	analysis	for	providing	a	meaning-ful	legal	benchmark	for	the	scope	of	SDT	flexibilities	in	a	case-study	on	GATS	Art.	V	 flexibility,	 and	discusses	 the	 implications	of	 replacing	SDT	flexibility	 by	 the	 general	 exception	 clauses.	 It	 shows	 that	 the	 two-tier	analysis	 indeed	 provides	 for	 an	 interesting	 legal	 instrument	 for	 intro-ducing	 transparency	 and	 graduation	 in	 SDT	 flexibilities,	 but	 that	 the	general	exceptions	do	not	appear	suitable	for	replacing	SDT	flexibilities	as	long	as	their	lists	of	legitimate	policy	objectives	remains	unchanged.	
1	WTO	Law	and	the	Challenge	of	Inequality	About	 two-thirds	 and	 therewith	 the	 majority	 of	 WTO	 members	 are	 developing	 or	 least-developed	 countries	 (LDCs).	 Contrary	 to	 other	 international	 organisations,1	the	 votes	 of	 all	members	 of	 the	WTO	 –	whether	 LDC	 or	 industrialised	 –	 have	 the	 same	weight:	 decisions	 are	taken	by	consensus.2	While	the	political	reality	of	differing	economic	and	political	strength	cer-tainly	 impacts	 on	 decisions	 taken	 by	 the	WTO,3	it	 is	 nevertheless	 remarkable	 that	 the	WTO’s																																									 																					*	Dr.	Charlotte	Sieber-Gasser,	Senior	Research	Fellow,	World	Trade	Institute,	University	of	Bern,	Bern	and	Graduate	Institute	of	International	and	Development	Studies,	Geneva.	1	E.g.	the	UN	has	a	two	chamber	system	with	the	Security	Council	and	its	permanent	members;	the	weight	of	the	vote	depends	on	the	money	transferred	to	the	organisation	both	within	the	IMF	and	the	World	Bank,	which	marginalizes	the	vote	of	developing	countries.	2	See	Agreement	Establishing	the	World	Trade	Organisation	Art.	IX.	3	See	for	a	critical	note	on	the	consensus	decision	making:	STEINBERG,	RICHARD	H.	(2002)	‘In	the	Shadow	of	Law	or	Power?	Consensus-Based	Bargaining	and	Outcomes	in	the	GATT/WTO’,	International	Organisation,	vol.	56,	no.	2,	pp.	339-374.	
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organisational	structure	treats	developing	countries	as	 full	members,	on	equal	 footing	with	 in-dustrialised	members.	Consequently,	developing	countries	have	a	decisive	shaping	power	in	all	decisions	taken	by	the	WTO	today.4		In	balance	 for	 the	equal	 rights	and	 treatment,	 the	WTO	provides	neither	 financial	 support	nor	permanent	exemptions	 from	 legal	obligations	 to	developing	countries.	Nonetheless,	 the	obliga-tions	of	developing	countries	have	been	eased	to	some	extent	in	comparison	with	industrialised	members	 of	 the	 WTO.	 For	 instance,	 developing	 countries	 are	 typically	 offered	 longer	 time	frames	for	meeting	their	legal	obligations,	in	addition	to	administrative	and	technical	assistance.	The	WTO	treaties	reflect	their	concern	about	the	difficult	economic	and	social	circumstances	by	providing	 for	 the	additional	 flexibility	–	 the	aim	being	 to	 facilitate	 trade	 liberalisation	 in	 these	poorer	countries	suffering	from	economic	insecurity	and	a	weak	institutional	environment.5		MUNIN	(2010)	states	that	this	reflects	the	principle	of	teaching	developing	countries	how	to	fish,	rather	than	sending	them	the	fish.6	While	this	is	one	possible	view	and	conceptual	explanation	of	the	legal	status	of	developing	countries	within	the	WTO,	arguably,	the	equal	treatment	as	mani-fested	 by	 the	WTO	 is	 also	 a	 strong	 commitment	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 free	 trade,	which	 in	 theory	should	be	more	efficient	in	alleviating	poverty	than	any	form	of	foreign	aid.7	Seen	this	way,	de-manding	equal	 rights	and	obligations	 from	developing	countries	 is	 in	 their	 interest:	 structural	adjustment,	a	trade-	and	competition-friendly	policy,	and	the	sheer	power	of	economic	activity	should	have	a	 sustainably	positive	 impact	on	economic	growth	 in	 the	poorer	 countries	of	 this	world.8	
1.1	A	Short	History	of	Special	and	Differential	Treatment	However,	while	the	concept	of	free	trade	is	fundamentally	based	on	equal	treatment	of	everyone	involved	in	it,	claims	started	early	–	referring	to	Aristoteles	among	others	–	that	equal	treatment	is	only	valid	as	 long	as	 it	 involves	equally	strong	economies.	MFN	treatment,	 the	core	of	equal	treatment	in	the	free	trade	regime,	was	not	seen	as	a	suitable	principle	for	trade	regulation	in-volving	countries	of	highly	unequal	economic	strength9.	In	the	–	initially	successful	–	attempt	to	accommodate	the	different	levels	of	economic	develop-ment	in	the	WTO,	the	concept	and	philosophy	of	progressive	liberalisation	was	introduced	in	the	early	GATT	in	1947.	Subsequent	rounds	of	multilateral	trade	negotiations	then	served	the	pur-pose	of	 ‘progressively	and	 individually’	 lowering	 tariff	 rates.	Both	market	access	and	domestic	needs	of	protection	were	taken	into	account	in	this	process,	as	well	as	needs	of	social	and	eco-
																																								 																					4	It	has	been	observed	that	developing	countries	used	to	be	reluctant	or	unsuccessful	with	respect	to	shap-ing	the	decisions	within	the	WTO	in	the	past.	This	may	have	changed,	given	that	developing	countries	are	now	organised	in	interest	groups	and	manage	to	exert	considerable	pressure	on	industrialised	countries.	See	also	ISMAIL,	FAIZEL	AND	VICKERS,	BRENDAN	(2011)	‘Towards	fair	and	inclusive	decision-making	in	the	WTO	negotiations’,	In:	Carolyn	Deere	Birkbeck	(ed.),	Making	Global	Trade	Governance	Work	for	Develop-
ment,	Cambridge	University	Press,	Cambridge,	pp.	461-485,	p.	478.	5	See	e.g.	KECK,	ALEXANDER	AND	LOW,	PATRICK	(2004)	Special	and	Differential	Treatment	in	the	WTO:	Why,	
When	and	How?,	Staff	Working	Paper	ERSD-2004-03,	WTO,	Geneva.	6	MUNIN,	NELLIE	(2010)	Legal	Guide	to	GATS,	Kluwer	Law	International,	Alphen	aan	den	Rijn,	p.	323.	7	See	e.g.	MORRISSEY,	OLIVER	(2006)	‘Aid	or	Trade,	or	Aid	and	Trade?’,	Australian	Economic	Review,	vol.	39,	no.	1,	pp.	78-88.	8	See	e.g.	WINTERS,	ALAN	L.	(2004)	‚Trade	Liberalisation	and	Economic	Performance:	An	Overview’,	The	
Economic	Journal,	vol.	114,	no.	493,	pp.	F4-F21.	9	EBERHARD	(2008),	p.	10.	
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nomic	development.10	This	avenue	was	supported	by	the	all	of	the	initial	25	Members	of	GATT	1947,	including	11	developing	countries.	They	all	agreed	on	the	potential	gains	from	multilateral	trade,	 assuming	 that	 ‘they	 identified	 the	 sectors	 in	which	 they	 had	 comparative	 advantage’.11	COTTIER	(2006)	writes	in	this	context:12	It	is,	therefore,	not	astonishing	that	the	basic	rules	relating	to	progressive	liber-alisation	per	se	do	not	need	to	take	recourse	to	the	concept	of	special	and	dif-ferential	[…]	treatment	for	[developing	countries].	The	same	rules	can	apply	to	all	Members	alike	as	results	can	be	tailored,	taking	into	account	highly	diverg-ing	levels	of	development.	In	the	early	1950s,	a	number	of	newly	independent	developing	countries	joined	the	GATT,	and	challenged	the	treatment	of	developing	countries	as	equal	partners	under	the	GATT:13	Most	of	these	countries	challenged	the	very	basis	on	which	the	GATT	was	built;	that	 is,	 as	a	 rules-based,	non-discriminatory	multilateral	 trading	system.	They	argued	 that	 it	 was	 not	 realistic	 to	 expect	 newly	 independent	 countries	 with	fragile	economies	to	compete	on	a	level	playing	field	with	established	industrial	countries	at	that	time.	Subsequent	pressure	from	developing	countries	and	later	also	the	UNCTAD	first	led	to	a	number	of	specific	measures	of	Special	and	Differential	Treatment	(SDT)	and	later	to	the	adoption	of	Part	IV	of	the	GATT,	which	was	entitled	‘Trade	and	Development’.	These	changes	formalised	the	ac-ceptance	of	the	non-reciprocity	principle	 ‘under	which	developed	countries	gave	up	their	right	to	ask	developing	countries	to	offer	concessions	during	trade	negotiations’.14	Finally,	introducing	the	 ‘Enabling	Clause’	during	 the	Tokyo	round	placed	SDT	at	 the	core	of	 the	GATT	system,	and	created	a	permanent	legal	basis	for	a	variety	of	measures	that	ought	to	support	and	protect	de-veloping	economies.	Before	the	Uruguay	round,	however,	the	majority	of	developing	countries	came	to	question	the	effectiveness	 of	 the	 different	 SDT	 provisions.	 They	 realised	 that	 substantial	 market	 access	 to	developed	 countries	 would	 by	 far	 outnumber	 the	 gains	 from	 SDT.15	As	 developed	 countries	were,	 however,	 not	 prepared	 to	 offer	 substantial	 commitments	 in	market	 access	 and	national	treatment	in	sensitive	sectors	crucial	to	economic	prospects	in	developing	countries,	the	concept	of	SDT	was	held	on	to	as	a	means	to	balance	inequalities	of	the	world	trading	system.	Finally,	on	completing	the	Uruguay	round,	SDT	was	firmly	anchored	across	the	board	in	WTO	law.16	The	majority	of	the	SDT	provisions	are	to	be	found	in	the	agreements	of	the	Uruguay	Round	and	the	number	of	SDT	provisions	is	high,	as	pointed	out	by	LEE	(2011):17																																									 																					10	COTTIER,	THOMAS	(2006)	‘From	Progressive	Liberalisation	to	Progressive	Regulation	in	WTO	Law’,	Jour-
nal	of	International	Economic	Law,	vol.	9,	no.	4,	pp.	779-821,	p.	779.	11	KESSIE,	EDWINI	(2007)	‘The	Legal	Status	of	Special	and	Differential	Treatment	Provisions	under	the	WTO	Agreements’,	In:	G.	A.	Bermann	and	P.	C.	Mavroidis	(eds.),	WTO	Law	and	Developing	Countries,	Cambridge	University	Press,	Cambridge,	pp.	12-35,	p.	16.	12	COTTIER	(2006),	p.	781.	13	KESSIE	(2007),	p.	16-7.	14	Ibid.,	p.	18.	15	Ibid.,	p.	21;	see	also	HOEKMAN,	BERNARD	(2005a)	‚Operationalising	the	Concept	of	Policy	Space	in	the	WTO:	Beyond	Special	and	Differential	Treatment’,	Journal	of	International	Economic	Law,	vol.	8,	no.	2,	pp.	405-424,	p.	410-1.	16	COTTIER	(2006),	p.	784;	HOEKMAN	(2005a),	p.	421-4.	17	LEE	(2011a),	p.	115.	
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One	 hundred	 and	 forty-five	 such	 provisions	 are	 scattered	 throughout	 WTO	agreements,	understandings,	 and	GATT	articles,	 among	which	 twenty-two	are	applied	exclusively	to	LDCs.	SDT	 provisions	 in	WTO	 law	 provide	 for	 different	 flexibilities	 and	 preferences	 for	 developing	countries	 and	LDCs.	 Provisions	 and	 flexibilities	 generally	 refer	 to	 developing	 countries,	which	encompasses	the	group	of	LDCs.	In	addition,	there	are	a	smaller	number	of	additional	provisions	that	 explicitly	 provide	 preferences	 to	 the	 LDC	 group.	 In	 1997,	 the	 ‘twin	 track	 approach’	 was	adopted	regarding	SDT.18	This	approach	consists	of	one	track	seeking	to	support	LDCs	with	flex-ibilities	in	their	commitments	to	market	liberalisation,	and	of	another	track	encouraging	devel-oped	countries	to	increase	commitments	regarding	market	access	for	and	technical	assistance	to	LDCs.19	This	approach	was	recently	complemented	by	the	Trade	Facilitation	Agreement	(TFA)	of	the	WTO20,	which	establishes	mainly	technical	assistance	for	the	benefit	of	low	income	countries.	Nevertheless,	 SDT	provisions	remain	 incoherently	 scattered	around	 the	different	 legal	 texts	of	the	WTO,	which	makes	it	challenging	to	keep	the	overview.		
1.2	Special	and	Differential	Treatment	remains	inefficient	However,	it	is	generally	acknowledged	that	SDT	so	far	has	failed	to	deliver	the	intended	results.	For	instance,	while	the	initial	UN	list	of	LDCs	was	composed	of	25	countries	in	1971,	the	number	of	 LDCs	 has	 nearly	 doubled	 since	 (from	 25	 in	 1971	 to	 48	 in	 2015).21	Furthermore,	 of	 the	 48	LDCs,	34	are	members	of	the	WTO,	with	eight	more	negotiating	to	join.	However,	membership	in	the	WTO	does	not	appear	 to	have	 resulted	 in	 substantial	welfare	 improvements	 for	LDCs	–	 in	four	 decades,	 only	 four	 countries	 graduated	 from	 the	 status	 of	 LDC	 (Botswana	 in	 1994,	 Cape	Verde	in	2007,	the	Maldives	in	2011,	and	Samoa	in	2014).	Some	believe	that	it	would	serve	developing	countries	more	economically	if	they	were	to	assume	full	responsibilities	at	the	WTO,	as	this	would	help	 locking	in	domestic	reforms	and	assist	sus-tainable	economic	growth	and	development.	Developing	countries	themselves,	however,	do	not	agree	with	the	view	that	SDT	has	failed	to	achieve	its	objective	and	therefore	should	be	eliminat-ed.	Rather	than	being	concerned	with	the	ineffectiveness	of	the	measures,	developing	countries	see	 a	 problem	 in	 the	 fact	 that	many	 SDT	measures	 are	 ‘best-endeavour’	 clauses,	which	 are	 in	essence	voluntary	for	developed	countries.	They	would	instead	prefer	strengthening	SDT	provi-sions	by	giving	them	the	force	of	law.22	Today,	the	problem	may	be	that	the	key	issues	of	multilateral	trade	liberalisation	are	no	longer	centred	on	tariff	reduction,	but	are	concerned	with	the	unification	of	regulation	of	domestic	leg-islation	and	other	behind-the-border	regulatory	barriers	to	trade.	Thus,	the	risk	of	multilateral	rules	having	a	negative	impact	on	economic	growth	in	developing	countries	has	increased,	since	
																																								 																					18	High-Level	Meeting	on	Integrated	Initiatives	for	Least-Developed	Countries’	Trade	Development,	Note	on	the	Meeting,	WT/LDC/HL/M/1	(26	November	1997).	19	MICHALOPOULOS,	CONSTANTINE,	2000,	Trade	and	Development	in	the	GATT	and	WTO:	The	Role	of	Spe-
cial	and	Differential	Treatment	for	Developing	Countries,	Working	Paper,	World	Bank,	Washington	DC,	p.	22.	20	The	Trade	Facilitation	Agreement	(TFA)	is	part	of	the	wider	negotiations	concluded	at	the	WTO	Minis-terial	Conference	in	Bali	in	December	2013.	Members	reached	an	agreement	on	the	Protocol	text	on	No-vember	27	2014.	See	also:	https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tradfa_e/tradfa_e.htm.	21	UN	Office	of	the	High	Representative	for	the	Least	Developed	Countries,	Landlocked	Developing	Coun-tries	and	Small	Island	Developing	States	(UN-OHRLLS)	[online],	Available	at:	http://unohrlls.org	(last	visited	4	July	2015).	22	KESSIE	(2007),	p.	34-5.	
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they	may	not	be	capable	of	guaranteeing	and	following	the	same	standards	as	developed	coun-tries.23	
1.3	Flaws	in	the	System	and	Suggestions	on	how	to	mend	it	In	 addition,	 the	 group	 of	 developing	 countries	 in	 the	 WTO	 encompasses	 some	 relatively	 ad-vanced	economies	such	as	Singapore,	Israel,	or	Chile.	De	jure,	 there	is	no	doubt	that	SDT	treat-ment	is	available	to	these	economies.	De	facto,	however,	it	is	in	some	cases	questionable	whether	SDT	applies	to	the	right	countries.	In	a	way,	this	contradicts	the	very	idea	of	SDT	and	therewith	risks	 eroding	 the	 whole	 concept.	 HOEKMAN,	MICHALOPOLOUS	 AND	WINTER	 (2003)	 therefore	 sug-gested	to	 introduce	an	 ‘LDC+’	group,	which	would	capture	 those	countries	 in	need	of	SDT,	but	exclude	those	countries	which	are	in	fact	better	off	by	assuming	full	responsibilities	under	WTO	law.24	They	argue	that	the	fewer	countries	are	eligible	for	SDT,	the	more	substantial	the	conces-sions	are	likely	to	be.25	Others	suggest	country-specific	evaluations,	which	would	result	in	tailored	packages	of	individ-ual	commitments,	temporal	exemptions	and	technical	assistance	for	each	developing	country	in	the	WTO.26	Other	ideas	are	rather	concerned	with	a	country’s	capabilities	of	implementing	and	enforcing	WTO	law	and	suggest	that	the	criteria	of	who	qualifies	for	SDT	be	redefined	depending	on	 a	 threshold	 specific	 to	 the	 application	 of	 individual	 rules.	 General	 pre-defined	 economic	needs	would,	following	this	idea,	automatically	identify	the	countries	eligible	for	and	most	likely	to	benefit	from	SDT.27	Many	more	suggestions	on	how	to	fix	the	gap	between	the	de	jure	system	of	SDT	and	the	de	facto	outcome	have	been	put	forward	in	recent	years.28	One	of	the	more	recent	suggestions	is	to	rethink	the	concept	of	single	undertaking.	In	a	way,	this	could	replace	the	cur-rent	SDT	system	and	allow	 for	more	of	 a	 ‘pick	and	choose	membership’	 in	 the	WTO	 for	 those	countries	that	cannot	afford	to,	or	are	not	yet	capable	of	complying	with	the	entire	body	of	WTO	law.29		COTTIER	 (2006)	 follows	 a	 similar	 logic	 by	 introducing	 the	 concept	 of	 graduation	 to	WTO	 law:	taking	into	account	the	different	levels	of	development	in	the	structure	and	content	of	the	rules	themselves	would	enable	a	return	to	the	concept	of	progressive	liberalisation	and	the	equal	ap-plication	 of	 single,	 uniform	 rules	 to	 all	members.	 This	would	 allow	 abandoning	 the	 relatively	tiring	debate	about	how	to	define	and	depict	different	groups	of	countries	based	on	their	respec-tive	level	of	development.	Rather	than	opting	out	of	obligations,	the	concept	of	graduation	aims	at	gradually	phasing	in.	WTO	law	would,	thus,	serve	as	the	basic	regime	defining	the	manner	and																																									 																					23	See	also	LOW,	PATRICK	(2007)	‚Is	the	WTO	Doing	Enough	for	Developing	Countries?’,	In:	G.	A.	Bermann	and	P.	C.	Mavroidis	(eds.),	WTO	Law	and	Developing	Countries,	Cambridge	University	Press,	Cambridge,	pp.	324-357.	24	HOEKMAN	ET	AL.	(2003).	25	Ibid.,	p.	27.	26	E.g.	PROWSE,	SUSAN	(2002),	‚The	Role	of	International	and	National	Agencies	in	Trade-related	Capacity	Building’,	The	World	Economy,	vol.	25,	no.	9,	pp.	1235-1261.	27	E.g.	STEVENS,	CHRISTOPHER	(2002)	‚The	Future	of	Special	and	Differential	Treatment	(S&D)	for	Developing	Countries	in	the	WTO’,	IDS	Working	Paper	163,	Institute	of	Development	Studies,	Sussex;	KECK,	ALEXANDER	AND	LOW,	PATRICK	(2004)	‚Special	and	Differential	Treatment	in	the	WTO:	Why,	When	and	How?’,	Staff	
Working	Paper	ERSD-2004-03,	World	Trade	Organisation,	Geneva.	28	See	for	an	overview	also	HOEKMAN	(2005a).	29	See	e.g.	COTTIER	(2006);	LEVY,	PHILIPPE	I.	(2006)	‚Do	We	Need	an	Undertaker	for	the	Single	Undertaking?	Considering	Angles	of	Variable	Geometry’,	In:	S.	J.	Evenett	and	B.	M.	Hoekman	(eds.),	Economic	Develop-
ment	and	Multilateral	Cooperation,	The	World	Bank	/	Palgrave	Macmillan,	Washington	DC,	pp.	417-438;	CORNFORD,	ANDREW	(2004)	Variable	Geometry	for	the	WTO:	Concept	and	Precedents,	Discussion	Paper,	UNCTAD,	Geneva.	
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direction	of	regulatory	development	and	trade	liberalisation,	but	countries’	individual	social	and	economic	 level	of	development	would	be	 factored	 in	as	determinant	of	 the	 individual	speed	of	liberalisation	and	commitment.30		Strikingly,	the	issue	of	re-thinking	the	concept	of	SDT	and	the	pursuit	of	ideas	brought	forward	by	the	pre-cited	authors	have	largely	disappeared	from	scholarly	publications	after	2005.	Thus,	we	are	left	today	with	not	much	more	than	the	insight	that	the	legal	position	of	developing	coun-tries	 in	 the	WTO	needs	 to	be	reconsidered	and	 that	 the	specific	measures	 targeting	at	helping	developing	countries	and	LDCs	to	participate	in	and	gain	from	the	global	market	have	so	far	not	led	to	the	results	that	were	intended.31	
1.4	Lessons	from	Case-Law	and	the	General	Exceptions	Prominently,	 policymakers	 and	 scholars	 suggest	 that	 WTO	 law	 provides	 too	 much	 flexibility	with	regard	to	compliance	and	therewith	impedes	the	positive	impact	of	trade	liberalisation	for	sustainable	economic	growth.	This	concern	is	mainly	related	to	SDT	provisions	granting	devel-oping	countries	and	LDCs	extra	flexibilities	and	is	not	related	to	technical	assistance	or	SDT	pro-visions	 encouraging	 developed	 countries	 to	 grant	 benefits	 to	 developing	 countries	 and	 LDCs.	The	general	concept	of	graduation	has	been	embraced	widely,	as	shown	above.		Since	graduation	requires	a	case-by-case	analysis,	a	general	legal	test	considering	the	individual	level	of	development	as	well	as	the	contribution	of	a	measure	towards	economic	growth	 is	re-quired.	The	general	exceptions	for	domestic	policies	in	GATT	XX	and	in	GATS	XIV	may	constitute	a	meaningful	regulatory	instrument	for	balancing	flexibility	for	versus	commitments	of	develop-ing	countries	and	LDCs	under	WTO	law.	In	particular,	they	are	concerned	with	the	justification	of	 inconsistent	domestic	policies	and	explicitly	also	refer	to	 ‘the	conditions,	which	prevail’	 in	a	WTO	member.	Possibly,	SDT	provisions	providing	 for	extra	 flexibility	 for	developing	countries	and	LDCs	could	even	be	replaced	by	a	consistent	 legal	practice	of	using	the	general	exceptions	for	development	policies	in	poorer	economies.	And	more	generally,	while	the	exceptions	are	not	
per	se	part	of	 the	 legal	body	of	SDT,	 they	could	nevertheless	 inform	the	 legal	discussion	about	the	scope	of	SDT	flexibilities.		Most	recent	case-law	and	scholarly	work	suggests	 that	 the	exception	clauses	 indeed	provide	a	meaningful	regulatory	instrument	in	balancing	domestic	trade	policies.32	Results	from	the	two-tier	analysis33	and	the	necessity-test34	in	 the	exception	clauses	could	therefore	serve	as	a	basis																																									 																					30	COTTIER	(2006).	31	See	also	Pauwelyn,	Joost,	2013,	‚The	End	of	Differential	Treatment	for	Developing	Countries?	Lessons	from	the	Trade	and	Climate	Change	Regimes’,	RECIEL,	vol.	22,	no.	1,	pp.	29-41.	32	BARTELS,	LORAND,	2015,	The	Chapeau	of	the	General	Exceptions	in	the	WTO	GATT	and	GATS	Agree-
ments,	(January	30,	2015).	Available	at	SSRN:	http://ssrn.com/abstract=2557971.	33	In	order	to	be	consistent	with	the	exception	clauses	in	GATT	and	GATS,	a	domestic	measure	has	to	pass	a	two-tier	test.	In	US	–	Gasoline,	the	Appellate	Body	presented	the	two-tier	test	under	GATT	Art.	XX:	“In	order	that	the	justifying	protection	of	Article	XX	may	be	extended	to	it,	the	measure	at	issue	must	not	only	come	under	one	or	another	of	the	particular	exceptions	—	paragraphs	(a)	to	(j)	—	listed	under	Article	XX;	it	must	also	satisfy	the	requirements	imposed	by	the	opening	clauses	of	Article	XX.	The	analysis	is,	in	other	words,	two-tiered:	first,	provisional	justification	by	reason	of	characterization	of	the	measure	under	XX(g);	second,	further	appraisal	of	the	same	measure	under	the	introductory	clauses	of	Article	XX.”	(Unit-ed	States	–	Standards	for	Reformulated	and	Conventional	Gasoline,	WT/DS2/AB/R,	April	29	1996,	para.	1152)	34	In	order	to	be	consistent	with	WTO	law,	a	domestic	measure	has	to	be	no	more	trade	restrictive	than	necessary.	The	corresponding	‚necessity-test’	was	elaborated	by	the	Appellate	Body	in	Brazil	–	Retreaded	
Tyres,	saying:	„In	order	to	determine	whether	a	measure	is	“necessary”	within	the	meaning	of	Article	XX(b)	of	the	GATT	1994,	a	panel	must	assess	all	the	relevant	factors,	particularly	the	extent	of	the	contri-
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for	a	legal	benchmark	for	SDT	flexibilities	in	the	future.	In	fact,	the	chapeau-test	could	generally	be	 used	 in	 cases	where	 different	 policy	 objectives	 and	 commitments	 under	 international	 law	have	 to	be	weighed	against	each	other.	For	 instance,	 the	chapeau-tests	are	also	discussed	as	a	meaningful	legal	instrument	to	balance	the	scope	of	a	public	interest	clause	in	WTO	law.35	This	general	approach	to	the	legal	regime	of	SDT	flexibilities	is	tested	and	discussed	in	this	paper	by	applying	the	chapeau-tests	to	the	SDT	flexibilities	provided	in	GATS	Art.	V.	Naturally	the	discus-sion	will	 have	 to	 be	 broadened	 to	 other	 provisions	 and	 a	more	 theoretical	 assessment	 in	 the	future.	
2	Lessons	from	Case-Law:	The	Chapeau-Tests,	Developing	Countries	
and	Exceptions	The	general	exception	clauses	in	WTO	law	are	GATT	Art.	XX	and	GATS	Art.	XIV.	Both	provisions	establish	the	legal	requirements	for	the	justification	of	a	discriminatory	measure.	Exemplary,	the	chapeau	of	GATT	Art.	XX	reads	as	follows:36	Subject	 to	 the	 requirement	 that	 such	 measures	 are	 not	 applied	 in	 a	 manner	which	would	constitute	a	means	of	arbitrary	or	unjustifiable	discrimination	be-tween	countries	where	 the	 same	conditions	prevail,	 or	a	disguised	restriction	on	international	trade,	nothing	in	this	Agreement	shall	be	construed	to	prevent	the	adoption	or	enforcement	by	any	contracting	party	of	measures:	Generally,	 the	measure	needs	 to	be	appropriate	 for	 its	objective,	and	 it	needs	 to	be	necessary.	Furthermore,	the	discrimination	shall	not	be	arbitrary	or	unjustifiable,	nor	shall	it	be	disguised.	A	 trade	 restrictive	measure	 furthermore	needs	 to	 serve	an	objective	 from	 the	 list	 of	 acknowl-edged	objectives	 in	 the	general	 exceptions.	While	 the	 chapeau-texts	of	 the	 two	general	 excep-tions	in	GATT	and	GATS	are	almost	identical,	the	lists	of	justified	objectives	differ.	GATT	Art.	XX	says:37	 (a)	necessary	to	protect	public	morals;	(b)	necessary	to	protect	human,	animal	or	plant	life	or	health;	(c)	relating	to	the	importations	or	exportations	of	gold	or	silver;	(d)	necessary	to	secure	compliance	with	laws	or	regulations	which	are	not	in-consistent	with	the	provisions	of	this	Agreement,	[…];	(e)	relating	to	the	products	of	prison	labour;	(f)	 imposed	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 national	 treasures	 of	 artistic,	 historic	 or	 ar-chaeological	value;	(g)	 relating	 to	 the	 conservation	 of	 exhaustible	 natural	 resources	 if	 such	measures	 are	made	 effective	 in	 conjunction	with	 restrictions	 on	 domestic	production	or	consumption;	
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 																														bution	to	the	achievement	of	a	measure’s	objective	and	its	trade	restrictiveness,	in	the	light	of	the	im-portance	of	the	interests	or	values	at	stake.	If	this	analysis	yields	a	preliminary	conclusion	that	the	meas-ure	is	necessary,	this	result	must	be	confirmed	by	comparing	the	measure	with	its	possible	alternatives,	which	may	be	less	trade	restrictive	while	providing	an	equivalent	contribution	to	the	achievement	of	the objective	pursued.“	(Brazil	–	Measures	Affecting	Imports	of	Retreaded	Tyres,	WT/DS332/AB/R,	December	3	2007,	para.	156.)	35	Sucker,	Franziska	and	Moon,	Gillian	(2015)	The	case	for	a	public	interest	clause	as	a	general	exception	in	trade	agreements,	draft,	SSRN.	36	GATT	Art.	XX.	37	GATT	Art.	XX.	
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(h)	undertaken	in	pursuance	of	obligations	under	any	intergovernmental	com-modity	agreement	[…];*	(i)	involving	restrictions	on	exports	of	domestic	materials	[…]	as	part	of	a	gov-ernmental	stabilization	plan;	[…];	(j)	essential	to	the	acquisition	or	distribution	of	products	in	general	or	local	short	supply;	[…].		And	GATS	Art.	XIV,	on	the	other	hand,	establishes	the	following	list	of	objectives:38	(a)	necessary	to	protect	public	morals	or	to	maintain	public	order;	(b)	necessary	to	protect	human,	animal	or	plant	life	or	health;	(c)	necessary	to	secure	compliance	with	 laws	or	regulations	which	are	not	 in-consistent	with	the	provisions	of	this	Agreement	including	those	relating	to:	(i)	the	prevention	of	deceptive	and	fraudulent	practices	or	to	deal	with	the	effects	of	a	default	on	services	contracts;	(ii)	the	protection	of	the	privacy	of	individuals	in	relation	to	the	processing	and	dissemination	of	personal	data	and	the	protection	of	confidentiality	of	individual	records	and	accounts;	(iii)	safety;	(d)	 inconsistent	with	Article	XVII,	provided	 that	 the	difference	 in	 treatment	 is	[…]	ensuring	the	[…]	effective	imposition	or	collection	of	direct	taxes	[…];	(e)	inconsistent	with	Article	II,	provided	that	the	difference	in	treatment	is	the	result	of	an	agreement	on	the	avoidance	of	double	taxation	[…].		The	differences	between	the	 two	 lists	of	 justified	objectives	 in	GATT	and	GATS	are	on	 the	one	hand	related	to	the	nature	of	services	or	goods	trade	respectively	and	on	the	other	hand	to	the	differences	in	the	year	of	the	respective	negotiations.	[...]39	If	 SDT	provisions	providing	 extra	 flexibility	 for	developing	 countries	 and	LDCs	were	 to	be	 re-placed	by	the	general	exceptions,	it	is	critical	to	discuss	whether	typical	SDT	flexibilities,	such	as	the	decision	to	use	a	longer	time-frame	for	the	implementation	of	commitments	under	WTO	law,	are	considered	a	measure	within	the	meaning	of	the	general	exceptions.	Furthermore,	the	impli-cations	of	 the	notion	 ‘between	countries	where	 the	same	conditions	prevail’	 for	SDT	flexibility	require	careful	consideration.	Finally,	in	the	lists	of	justified	objectives,	the	objective	to	promote	economic	development	 is	not	 to	be	 found.	Possibly,	however,	some	SDT	flexibilities	may	serve	one	of	the	justified	objectives	nevertheless.	If	 the	 scope	 of	 SDT	 flexibilities	were	 to	 be	merely	 informed	 by	 the	well-established	 chapeau-tests	and	regulatory	logic	of	the	exception	clauses	in	GATT	and	GATS,	case-law	is	more	relevant	for	legal	guidance.	Whether	the	chapeau-tests	and	the	regulatory	logic	of	the	general	exceptions	are	indeed	suitable	for	establishing	a	legal	benchmark	for	SDT	flexibility	can	be	discussed	theo-retically	on	the	basis	mainly	of	the	recent	clarifications	in	WTO	case-law.		
2.1	Most	recent	Case-Law	The	 respondent	 in	 a	WTO	 dispute	 regularly	 uses	 the	 general	 exceptions	 in	 GATT	Art.	 XX	 and	GATS	Art.	XIV	as	a	defense.	Since	1994,	no	less	than	44	cases	dealt	with	the	general	exceptions,	43	of	them	with	GATT	Art.	XX	and	one	with	GATS	Art.	XIV.	However,	only	in	EC-Asbestos	the	re-spondent’s	defense	was	entirely	 successful.	Thus,	 it	 appears	generally	difficult	 to	 justify	 a	dis-																																								 																					38	GATS	Art.	XIV.	39	Add	short	review	of	negotiating	history	explaining	the	differences.	
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criminatory	trade	measure	with	the	general	exceptions.	Nevertheless,	WTO	members	continue	to	use	the	general	exceptions	as	a	possible	defense	and	case-law	therewith	continues	to	be	cru-cial	in	the	understanding	and	interpretation	of	the	general	exceptions.	[review	of	most	recent	case	law]	Unfortunately,	however,	the	case-law	is	naturally	limited	to	the	list	of	legitimate	objectives	in	the	subparagraphs	of	 the	 general	 exceptions	 to	date.	More	 recently,	moral	 considerations	 and	 the	protection	of	the	environment	were	at	the	heart	of	disputes	involving	GATT	Art.	XX.	Developing	countries	and	LDCs	to	date	have	mainly	entered	their	economic	development	policies	under	SDT	instead	of	the	general	exceptions,	there	is	to	date	no	specific	case-law	concerned	with	trade	re-strictive	measures	explicitly	linked	with	and	justified	by	its	economic	development	objective.		This	renders	 the	most	recent	discussion	on	how	to	 integrate	considerations	beyond	trade	 into	WTO	 law	 (human	 rights,	morality,	 labour	 conditions,	 environment,	 aso.)	 less	 relevant	 for	 the	assessment	of	how	appropriate	the	general	exceptions	are	for	replacing	of	informing	SDT	flexi-bilities.	While	some	flexibilities	–	the	waiver	for	generics	for	LDCs,	for	instance	–	arguably,	could	also	be	 justified	clearly	with	 the	protection	of	human	 life	or	one	of	 the	other	 legitimate	objec-tives,	most	measures	 targeting	 economic	 development	 in	 a	 poor	 economy	will	 only	 be	 linked	with	 one	 of	 the	 objectives	 in	 the	 subparagraphs	more	 indirectly.	 Furthermore,	 the	 legitimate	objectives	in	the	general	exception	are	targeting	other	policy	considerations	beyond	trade.	Typi-cally,	 economic	 development	 policies	 are,	 however,	 trade	 considerations.	 Therefore,	 case-law	today	informs	the	interpretation	and	understanding	of	the	general	exceptions,	without	however,	directly	 relating	 to	 the	 specific	 suitability	 of	 the	 exception	 clauses	 for	meaningfully	 informing	SDT	flexibility.	
2.2	“The	conditions	which	prevail”	One	 of	 the	 conditions	 set	 out	 in	 the	 chapeau	 of	 the	 general	 exceptions	 is	 ‘between	 countries	where	 the	 same	 conditions	 prevail’.	 Bartels	 (2014)	 suggests	 that	 not	 the	 countries	 should	 be	compared,	but	the	products.	This	view	is	substantiated	by	case-law	and	by	the	fact	that	the	term	‘countries’	is	used,	instead	of	‘WTO	member’.40	Furthermore,	he	suggests	that	‘unjustifiable	dis-crimination’	 and	 ‘where	 the	 same	 conditions	 prevail’	 essentially	 is	 the	 same,	 both	 concerned	with	justifying	the	discriminatory	effect	of	a	trade	measure.41	Consequently,	the	relative	level	of	development	in	a	particular	country	would	be	irrelevant,	and	instead	the	focus	of	the	provision’s	discrimination	test	should	be	about	products	from	different	origins.	However,	 the	 provisions	 do	 not	 refer	 to	 products	 or	 services	 from	 different	 countries,	 but	 to	discrimination	between	countries.	Clearly	also,	the	prevailing	conditions	are	linked	to	the	coun-tries	and	not	to	the	product	or	service.	Thus,	it	is	submitted	here	that	the	general	exceptions	can	be	interpreted	in	a	way	that	the	level	of	economic	and	institutional	development	in	a	country	of	origin,	as	well	as	in	the	country	implementing	the	trade-restrictive	measure,	be	taken	into	con-sideration	for	the	discrimination	test.		Arguably,	this	interpretation	is	indirectly	supported	by	the	difficulties	in	dealing	with	the	exact	meaning	of	the	prevailing	conditions	demonstrated	in	case-law.	The	DSB	interprets	and	applies																																									 																					40	Bartels,	Lorand,	2014,	The	Chapeau	of	Article	XX	GATT:	A	New	Interpretation,	Legal	Studies	Research	Paper	Series,	Paper	No.	40/2014,	University	of	Cambridge,	Cambridge,	pp.	7-8.	41	Bartels,	Lorand,	2014,	The	Chapeau	of	Article	XX	GATT:	A	New	Interpretation,	Legal	Studies	Research	Paper	Series,	Paper	No.	40/2014,	University	of	Cambridge,	Cambridge,	pp.	8-10.	
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this	 half-sentence	of	 the	 chapeau	 incoherently	 and	has	 linked	 the	prevailing	 conditions	 to	 the	products	or	services,	the	countries,	or	the	nature	of	the	measure	itself	in	the	past.42		
2.3	SDT	and	the	two-tier	analysis	As	mentioned	before,	the	difficulty	with	replacing	SDT	flexibility	with	the	general	exception	lies	primarily	with	 the	exhaustive	 list	of	 legitimate	objectives	as	provided	 in	 the	subparagraphs	of	the	general	exceptions.	The	lists	do	not	encompass	 ‘economic	development’	as	a	 legitimate	ob-jective	for	a	trade	restrictive	measure.	The	first	part	of	the	two-tier	analysis	of	the	general	excep-tion	 consists,	 however,	 of	 substantiating	 that	 the	 trade	 restrictive	measure	 serves	 one	 of	 the	legitimate	objectives.	The	main	question	 is,	 therefore,	whether	 there	 is	a	sufficiently	clear	 link	between	one	of	 the	 legitimate	objectives	and	 the	economic	development	policy	related	 to	SDT	flexibility.		As	the	Panel	pointed	out	in	US-Gambling,	the	content	of	the	concepts	embedded	in	the	list	of	le-gitimate	objectives	‘can	vary	in	time	and	space,	depending	upon	a	range	of	factors	including	pre-vailing	 social,	 cultural,	 ethical,	 and	 religious	values’43,	 particularly	with	 regard	 to	public	moral	and	 public	 order.	Diebold	 (2007)	 adds	 that	 not	 only	 do	 they	 vary	 in	 time	 and	 space,	 but	 also	from	one	country	to	another.44	Thus,	despite	being	exhaustive,	the	lists	of	 legitimate	objectives	also	provide	for	the	opportunity	of	a	case-by-case	analysis	and	of	taking	into	consideration	the	particular	situation	of	an	individual	WTO	member.	If	the	policy	objective	of	the	trade	restrictive	measure	falls	within	the	scope	of	one	of	the	legiti-mate	objectives	listed	in	the	general	exceptions,	the	measure	and	the	objective	need	to	be	suffi-ciently	 connected.	 Or	 in	 other	 words,	 the	 trade	 restrictive	 measure	 has	 to	 be	 necessary	 to	achieve	the	policy	objective.	The	so-called	necessity	test	is	particularly	interesting	with	regard	to	SDT	 flexibility:	 It	 forces	 the	 respondent	 or	 generally	 a	 developing	 country	 or	 LDC	 to	 consider	carefully	the	implications	of	its	trade	restrictive	measure.	The	necessity-test	would	in	particular	in	theory	rule	out	all	the	flexibility	that	according	to	economists	is	counter-productive	with	re-gard	to	economic	development.	Finally,	the	trade	restrictive	measure	shall	not	arbitrarily	and	unjustifiably	discriminate	between	countries	where	 the	 same	 conditions	 prevail,	 nor	 shall	 it	 constitute	 a	 disguised	 restriction	 on	trade.	 It	 is	submitted	here,	 that	 in	particular	also	this	second	part	of	 the	two-tier	analysis	pro-vides	the	basis	for	taking	into	consideration	the	objectives	of	SDT.	It	allows	considering	the	eco-nomic	and	 institutional	conditions	 in	 the	country	 that	 implements	a	 trade	restrictive	measure,	while	 it	 also	 requires	 considering	 the	 economic	 and	 institutional	 conditions	 in	 the	 countries	against	which	the	trade	restrictive	measure	develops	discrimination.	Arguably,	trade	restrictive	measure	 aiming	 a	 fostering	 economic	 development	 cannot	 legitimately	 discriminate	 against	other	 countries	 where	 ‘the	 same	 conditions	 prevail’.	 South-South	 integration	 should,	 thus,	 in	particular	be	encouraged	by	this	interpretation	of	the	chapeau	of	the	general	exceptions.	
																																								 																					42	Add	details	from	case-law.	43	WTO	Panel	Report,	United	States	–	Measures	affecting	the	Cross-Border	Supply	of	Gambling	and	Betting	
Services	(US-Gambling),	WT/DS285/R,	adopted	20	April	2005,	para.	6.461.	44	Diebold,	Nicolas	(2007)	‚The	Morals	and	Order	Exceptions	in	WTO	Law:	Balancing	the	Toothless	Tiger	and	the	Undermining	Mole’,	Journal	of	International	Economic	Law,	vol.	11,	no.	1,	pp.	43-74,	p.	50.	
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3	Testing	the	Tests	In	order	to	substantiate	the	theoretical	discussion,	the	two	scenarios	of	1)	replacing	SDT	flexibil-ities	altogether	with	the	general	exceptions,	and	2)	informing	the	scope	SDT	flexibility	by	apply-ing	the	two-tier	analysis	to	SDT	measures,	have	to	be	tested	against	potential	cases.	Obviously,	the	differing	scope	and	character	of	the	different	SDT	flexibilities	in	WTO	law	in	general	and	in	use	by	developing	countries	and	LDCs	in	particular	requires	investigation	and	assessment.	Not	all	 of	 the	different	 SDT	 flexibilities	may	be	 equally	 relevant	 in	 terms	of	potential	 to	develop	a	detrimental	economic	impact	or	in	terms	of	practical	relevance.		The	subsequent	paragraphs	provide	a	test-run	of	one	of	 the	SDT	flexibilities	that	has	a	proven	track-record	of	having	the	ability	to	negatively	impact	on	economic	growth,	if	the	individual	pre-conditions	of	an	individual	country	are	not	carefully	assessed	and	taken	into	consideration	with	regard	 to	 the	 regulatory	 scope	 of	 the	 flexibility.	 The	 analysis	 shows	 that	 assessing	 other	 SDT	flexibilities	and	 their	 relation	with	 the	general	exceptions	may	be	worthwhile	 in	order	 to	sub-stantiate	the	discussion	in	the	future.	
3.1	GATS	Art.	V	GATS	Art.	V	generally	establishes	the	requirements	that	a	Preferential	Trade	Agreement	(PTA)	in	services	needs	to	fulfill	in	order	to	qualify	for	the	MFN	exemption.	It	basically	requires	that	a	PTA	covers	substantially	all	the	services	trade	between	its	members	and	that	it	does	not	a	priori	exclude	one	of	the	services	sectors	or	one	of	the	modes	of	service	supply.	Thus,	in	order	to	com-ply	with	WTO	 law,	generally	a	PTA	would	be	expected	 to	 liberalise	almost	 fully	services	 trade	between	its	members	and	to	cover	all	of	the	12	services	sectors	listed	under	GATS.45	A	 first	 important	 flexibility	with	 respect	 to	meeting	 the	 requirements	 of	 GATS	 Art.	 V	 is	 to	 be	found	already	in	GATS	Art.	V:1.	It	says	that	an	economic	integration	agreement	has	to	fulfill	the	requirements	 of	 GATS	Art.	 V	 either	when	 it	 enters	 into	 force	 or	 ‘on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 reasonable	time-frame’.46	This	temporal	dimension	can	also	be	found	in	GATT	XXIV	and	is	meant	to	accom-modate	development	concerns.	A	next	SDT	flexibility	is	embedded	in	GATS	Art.	V:1	lit.	b,	GATS	Art.	V:2,	which	stipulates	that	‘consideration	may	be	given	to	the	relationship	of	the	agreement	to	 a	 wider	 process	 of	 economic	 integration	 or	 trade	 liberalisation	 among	 the	 countries	 con-cerned’.47	The	core	of	SDT	 flexibility	of	GATS	Art.	V	 lies,	however	 in	GATS	Art.	V:3,	which	pro-vides	flexibility	specifically	to	developing	countries	with	respect	to	the	requirements	established	in	GATS	Art.	V:1,	‘substantial	sectorial	coverage’	and	‘absence	and	elimination	of	substantially	all	discrimination’.	GATS	V:3	lit.	a	says:48	Where	developing	countries	are	parties	to	an	agreement	of	the	type	referred	to	in	paragraph	1,	flexibility	shall	be	provided	for	regarding	the	conditions	set	out	in	paragraph	1,	particularly	with	reference	to	subparagraph	(b)	thereof,	 in	ac-cordance	with	the	level	of	development	of	the	countries	concerned,	both	overall	and	in	individual	sectors	and	subsectors.		The	scope	of	this	specific	flexibility	for	PTAs	involving	at	least	one	developing	country	is,	how-ever,	unclear.	Adlung	and	Miroudot	(2012)	submit	that	at	least	it	would	not	cover	the	introduc-																																								 																					45	For	more	details,	see	Sieber-Gasser,	Charlotte,	2016,	Developing	Countries	and	Preferential	Services	Tra-
de,	Cambridge	University	Press,	Cambridge	[forthcoming	July	2016].	46	GATS	Art.	V:1.	47	GATS	Art.	V:2.	48	GATS	Art.	V:3	lit.	a.	
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tion	of	new	restrictions	and	discriminatory	elements,	which	would	be	more	restrictive	than	the	countries’	commitments	in	their	GATS	schedules.49	That	is,	however,	to	a	certain	extent	obvious,	since	GATS	commitments	would	remain	in	place	even	if	a	PTA	was	more	restrictive.	In	general,	consideration	 should	 be	 paid	 to	 the	 state	 and	 prospects	 of	 the	 service	 sectors.	 Uncompetitive	sectors	may,	thus,	benefit	from	flexibility	and	therewith	become	subject	of	exemption	or	a	lesser	degree	of	liberalisation.	However,	what	is	typical	for	SDT	flexibility	in	general	–	and	why	the	SDT	flexibility	of	GATS	Art.	V	 is	used	here	 for	 the	theoretical	assessment	–	 is,	 that	 finally,	 the	exact	scope	of	the	flexibility	remains	unclear.50		Finally,	 GATS	Art.	 V:3	 lit.	 b	 in	 conjunction	with	 GATS	Art.	 V:6	 allows	 PTAs	 among	 developing	countries	to	be	restricted	to	service	suppliers	owned	or	controlled	by	nationals	of	the	members	to	the	PTA,	and	to	exempt	third	country	nationals,	even	if	they	previously	engaged	in	substantive	business	operations.	GATS	V:3	 lit	b,	 thus,	basically	exempts	South-South	PTAs	in	services	from	the	obligations	of	GATS	V:6.	This	additional	flexibility	–	although	substantially	clear	with	regard	to	its	scope	–	is	of	relatively	little	practical	relevance.	Whether	or	not	a	PTA	in	services	among	developing	countries	may	exclude	entire	services	sectors	from	its	application	is,	however,	highly	relevant,	given	economic	evidence	which	points	towards	the	crucial	role	of	services	trade	liber-alisation	in	generating	sustainable	economic	growth	and	value-added	production	in	poor	econ-omies.	
3.2	Applying	the	Two-Tier	analysis	to	the	scope	of	flexibility	for	South-South	PTAs	in	
Services	The	analysis	of	more	than	30	PTAs	in	services	among	developing	countries	showed,	that	the	SDT	flexibilities	granted	in	GATS	Art.	V	are	rarely	used.	In	fact,	South-South	PTAs	in	services	tend	to	be	 slightly	more	 compliant	with	 GATS	Art.	 V	 overall	 than	 other	 PTAs	 are:	most	 of	 the	 South-South	PTAs	cover	almost	all	sectors,	all	but	one	provide	for	National	Treatment	in	general,	basi-cally	all	of	them	cover	all	modes	of	supply,	and	14	out	of	23	treaties	are	considered	to	be	GATS+	with	respect	to	the	overall	depth	of	liberalisation.51	There	are,	however,	exceptions	to	this	rule.	Most	prominently,	the	PTA	among	Central	America	and	Panama,	which	fully	liberalizes	three	sectors	(business	and	professional	services,	communi-cation	services	and	education	services),	while	it	 is	overall	considered	as	being	more	restrictive	than	 the	commitments	of	 the	parties	made	under	GATS	(so-called	GATS-minus).	Basically,	 this	agreement	is	a	sectorial	agreement	with	a	distinct	focus	on	three	specific	services	sectors,	while	other	sectors	are	not	further	liberalized	than	the	GATS	at	all.	Arguably,	sectorial	agreements	are	within	the	scope	of	SDT	flexibility	of	GATS	Art.	V.		When	 theoretically	 assessing,	 whether	 Central	America	 –	Panama	 (2002)	 would	 also	 pass	 the	two	 tier	 analysis	 of	 the	 general	 exception	 in	 GATS	 Art.	 XIV,	 it	 is	 first	 of	 all	 assumed	 that	 the	agreement	is	sectorial	on	purpose	and	in	order	to	promote	economic	development	between	the	parties	 to	 the	 agreement.	 Furthermore,	 it	 is	 submitted	 that	 indeed	 the	 PTA	 is	 considered	 a	measure	within	 the	meaning	 of	 GATS	 Art.	 XIV.	 It	 is,	 thus,	 questionable,	 whether	 the	measure	discriminates	third	party	service	providers	in	the	three	sectors,	which	are	fully	liberalized	under	
																																								 																					49	Adlung,	Rudolf,	and	Miroudot,	Sébastien,	2012,	Poison	in	the	wine?	Tracing	GATS-minus	Commitments	in	
Regional	Trade	Agreements,	Staff	Working	Paper,	ERSD	No.	2012-04,	World	Trade	Organisation,	Geneva,	p.	8.	50	See	Sieber-Gasser,	Charlotte,	2016.	51	See	Sieber-Gasser,	Charlotte,	2016.	
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Central	America	–	Panama	(2002),	because	the	agreement	does	not	qualify	for	the	MFN	exemp-tion	and	the	violation	of	GATS	Art.	V	cannot	be	justified	under	the	general	exception.		Thus,	the	parties	to	the	agreement	will	have	to	demonstrate	that	the	discrimination	in	the	three	services	sectors	serves	one	of	the	legitimate	objectives	as	listed	in	GATS	Art.	XIV.	Depending	on	the	respective	reasons,	the	protection	of	public	morals	or	public	order	(GATS	Art.	XIV	lit.	a),	or	the	protection	of	human	life	or	health	(GATS	Art.	XIV	lit.	b)	may	be	relevant.	However,	in	the	case	of	a	PTA,	and	considering	case-law,	it	may	be	very	difficult	and	rare	to	substantiate	a	GATS	Art.	V	violation	with	one	of	the	legitimate	objectives	in	GATS	Art.	XIV.	Thus,	as	long	as	the	promotion	of	economic	development	per	se	 is	not	 included	 in	 the	 list	 of	 legitimate	objectives,	 it	may	not	be	possible	to	replace	SDT	flexibilities	entirely	with	the	general	exceptions.	Nevertheless,	with	regard	to	the	necessity-test,	substantiating	that	the	deviation	from	GATS	Art.	V	 is	 necessary	 for	 the	 objective	 (promoting	 sustainable	 economic	 growth)	 arguably	would	 be	possible	 to	demonstrate.	Economic	 theory	and	evidence	shows	that	 trade	 liberalization	 in	ser-vices	between	developing	countries	and	in	specific	services	sectors	plays	a	key	role	in	fostering	sustainable	 economic	 growth	 and	 value-added	 production.	 Arguably,	 the	 parties	 to	 Central	
America	–	Panama	(2002)	would	be	able	to	demonstrate	that	the	measure	is	necessary	in	order	to	reach	their	objective	of	promoting	sustainable	economic	growth.	[add	economic	literature	and	reference	to	Central	America	–	Panama	(2002)]	Thus,	with	regard	to	the	second	submission,	that	the	 two-tier	analysis	of	 the	general	 exceptions	provides	a	meaningful	 legal	benchmark	 for	 the	scope	of	SDT	flexibilities,	the	theoretical	assessment	shows	that	this	may	indeed	be	the	case	par-ticularly	with	regard	to	the	necessity-test.	Finally,	 it	 needs	 to	be	 assessed	whether	 the	measure	 arbitrarily	 or	unjustifiably	discriminates	between	 countries	where	 the	 same	 conditions	 prevail,	 and	whether	 it	 constitutes	 a	 disguised	restriction	on	trade.	Since	the	measure	is	part	of	a	publicly	available	PTA,	it	is	not	to	be	consid-ered	disguised.	Linked	with	 the	 interpretation	of	 the	prevailing	conditions	brought	 forward	 in	this	paper,	the	measure	would	be	arbitrary	if	 it	discriminates	against	services	and	service	pro-viders	originating	in	countries	in	which	the	same	conditions	prevail.	Given	that	the	fully	liberal-ised	sectors	in	Central	America	–	Panama	(2002)	arguably	require	geographical	proximity,	simi-lar	economic	development,	and	similar	language	in	order	to	serve	the	objective	of	the	measure,	indeed	 the	measure	may	 be	 considered	 discriminatory	 vis-à-vis	 Spanish-speaking	 third	 coun-tries	in	the	region	with	a	similar	level	of	development.	Other	third	countries,	however,	would	not	fulfill	the	requirements	of	the	same	conditions	prevailing,	and	therefore,	the	measure	would	not	be	considered	discriminatory	against	their	services	or	service	providers.	This	second	part	of	the	two-tier	analysis	may	force	countries	to	extend	their	SDT	flexibilities	to	other	developing	coun-tries	 that	 fulfill	 the	 basic	 conditions	 economically	 required	 to	 promote	 sustainable	 economic	growth	and	to	contribute	to	fostering	value-added	production.	This	appears	fully	in	line	with	the	underlying	logic	of	SDT	and	of	WTO	law	in	general,	which	is	to	continuously	liberalise	trade	to	the	benefit	of	all	WTO	members	and	to	poorer	economies	in	particular.	
3.3	Preliminary	Findings	The	 theoretical	 discussion	 shows	 that	 replacing	 SDT	 flexibilities	 with	 the	 general	 exceptions	may	only	be	possible	 in	 rare	cases	of	SDT	 flexibilities,	where	 those	 flexibilities	are	sufficiently	linked	with	one	of	the	legitimate	objectives	of	the	general	exceptions	(e.g.	human	life	in	the	case	of	generics).		
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However,	 the	 example	 of	 applying	 the	 two-tier	 analysis	 to	 the	 SDT	 flexibilities	 in	GATS	Art.	 V	also	 shows	 that	 the	 necessity-test	 along	with	 the	 second	 part	 of	 the	 two-tier	 analysis	 indeed	provides	a	meaningful	 legal	benchmark	 for	 substantiating	 the	 scope	of	 flexibility	 attributed	 to	developing	countries	and	LDCs	under	WTO	law.	Obviously,	the	basic	suggestions	brought	forward	in	this	paper	require	further	analysis	and	re-search	with	regard	to	the	different	types	of	SDT	flexibilities.	Possibly	some	SDT	flexibilities	are	more	suitable	for	the	general	exceptions	than	others.	Furthermore,	the	legal	benchmark	for	the	scope	of	SDT	flexibility	provided	by	the	necessity-test	and	the	second	part	of	the	two-tier	anal-yses	of	the	general	exceptions	needs	to	be	carefully	assessed	in	terms	of	economic	implications	and	in	terms	of	legal	coherence.	
4	Conclusion	The	promotion	of	economic	development	in	poor	countries,	as	well	as	the	promise	to	contribute	to	 fair	and	equal	economic	growth	 lies	at	 the	heart	of	WTO	 law.	SDT	 flexibilities	are	one	 legal	instrument	to	implement	and	enforce	this	objective.	However,	SDT	flexibilities	in	particular	have	been	widely	inefficient	in	achieving	their	goal	in	the	past.	On	the	one	hand,	the	term	‘developing	country’	under	WTO	law	comprises	a	large	group	of	countries	with	substantially	different	levels	of	respective	development.	On	the	other	hand,	the	scope	of	SDT	flexibilities	remains	largely	un-clear	and	may	at	times	be	to	large	in	order	to	still	contribute	economically	to	their	objective	of	promoting	economic	growth.	This	paper	submits	that	1)	SDT	flexibilities	may	be	replaced	by	the	general	exceptions	in	GATT	Art.	XX	and	GATS	Art.	XIV,	and	2)	the	two-tier	analysis	of	the	general	exceptions	may	be	applied	to	SDT	flexibilities	in	order	to	introduce	a	meaningful	legal	benchmark	to	their	scope.	Applying	theoretically	 the	general	exception	of	GATS	Art.	XIV	to	 the	SDT	flexibilities	embedded	 in	GATS	Art.	V	and	to	the	PTA	Central	America	–	Panama	(2002),	shows	that	SDT	flexibilities	may	be	diffi-cult	 to	 subsume	under	one	of	 the	 legitimate	objectives	of	GATS	Art.	XIV.	As	 long	as	 ‘economic	development’	is	not	considered	a	legitimate	policy	objective	for	trade	restrictive	measures,	SDT	flexibilities	may	 arguably	 not	 be	 replaced	 by	 the	 general	 exceptions.	However,	 the	 theoretical	assessment	also	showed	that	indeed	the	necessity-test	as	well	as	the	second	part	of	the	two-tier	analysis	of	GATS	Art.	XIV	could	provide	a	meaningful	legal	benchmark	for	establishing	the	scope	of	 SDT	 flexibility	 on	 a	 case-by-case	 basis.	 Applying	 the	 two-tier	 analysis	 to	 SDT	 flexibilities	would	furthermore	increase	graduation	in	SDT,	and	therewith	help	overcome	one	of	the	obsta-cles	of	SDT	to	achieve	its	objective.	
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